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Abstract
Individuals have opinions but can change them under the influence
of others. The recent models of Sznajd (missionaries), of Deffuant et
al. (negotiators), and of Krause and Hegselmann (opportunists) are
reviewed here, while the voter and Ising models, Galam’s majority
rule and the Axelrod multicultural model were dealt with by other
lecturers at this 8th Granada Seminar.
1 Introduction
University professors know everything and are always right; lesser people
change their opinion after interactions with others, as discussed in this re-
view as well as in the lectures of Redner, Toral, and San Miguel. Missing at
this Granada seminar was the Latane´ model [1, 2] which is a generalized Ising
model; simulations are reviewed in [3]. Here we concentrate on the models
of Sznajd [4], Krause and Hegselmann [5], and Deffuant et al [6], all three
of which differ drastically in their definitions but give similar results, just as
many variants of the Sznajd model were shown to have similar properties
in an analytical approximation [7]. For completeness we mention that the
language bit-string models of part I of our review series can also be inter-
preted as binary Axelrod models for multi-culturality: instead of taking over
elements of another language, one may also replace elements of the native
culture by those of another culture. On the other hand, the Latane´ model
was already applied to languages in [8].
In the next section we first define the three models in a unified way, and
then present, section by section, selected results.
2 The Three Models
Each individual i (i = 1, 2, . . .N) has one opinion Oi on one particular
question. This opinion can be binary (0 or 1), multivalued integer (Oi =
1
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Figure 1: Continuous opinions for 450 million negotiators with everybody
possibly connected to everybody: Two centrist parties fight for victory while
much smaller extremist parties survive unharmed. From [9].
1, 2, ..., Q) or continuous real (0 ≤ Oi ≤ 1). The neighbours j of individual
i may be those on a square lattice, or on a Baraba´si-Albert network, or any
other individual. Because of interactions between individuals i and j, one of
them or both may change opinion from one time step (t) to the next (t+1),
according to rules to be specified below.
“Bounded confidence” [5, 6] means that only people with similar opinions
talk to each other. If in politics five parties 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 sit in parliament,
traditionally ordered from left to right, then a left-centre coalition of 2 and
3, or a rightist coalition of 3, 4, and 5 may work, while collaboration of the
extremes 1 and 5 seldomly happen in formal coalition agreements. Thus we
may assume that only parties talk to each other which differ by not more
than one opinion unit, or by ǫQ units more generally for Q opinions, or by
ǫ for real opinions between zero and one. If ǫ ≥ 1, bounded confidence is
ignored; if ǫ ≪ 1, confidence is strongly bounded. This parameter ǫ thus
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Final votes in Hegselmann-Krause (+) and Deffuant et al (x) model; eps=0.15; opinions scaled to 5
Figure 2: Final distribution of votes for 300,000 opportunists (dashed line)
and negotiators (solid line), with opinions scaled from 0 to 5 instead of the
original interval [0,1] to facilitate comparison with missionaries, Fig.3.
measures the tolerance for dissent or the openness to different opinions.
The three models (each of which was studied in several variants) are
missionaries [4], opportunists [5] and negotiators [6].
Missionaries of the Sznajd model convince all neighbours (within their
confidence bound) of their mission, particularly if two neighbouring mis-
sionaries have the same opinion. For example, if on a square lattice two
neighbours have the same opinion O = 2 out of Q = 5 possible opinions,
and the confidence bound is one unit, then they force their opinion 2 onto
all (at most six) lattice neighbours which before had opinions 1, 2, or 3; they
cannot convince neighbours with opinions 4 or 5.
Opportunists of the Krause-Hegselmann model ask all their neighbours
(within their confidence bound) for their opinion, and then follow the arith-
metic average of them. Thus for Q = 5, a present opinion Oi(t) = 2 of the
considered individual and a confidence bound of one unit, the new Oi(t+ 1)
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Final votes in Sznajd square lattice, five opinions, unit confidence bound, 300 x 300 people
Figure 3: Final distribution of votes for 301× 301 missionaries with discrete
opinions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and unit confidence bound. Thus two neighbours of
opinion 4 convince all those neighbours to the same opinion 4 which had
opinions 3 or 5 before.
will be the rounded arithmetic average of all neighbour opinions except 4 and
5.
Negotiators of Deffuant et al. each select one discussion partner at one
time step. If their opinions Oi and Oj differ by less than the confidence
bound, their two opinions mutually get closer without necessarily agreeing
completely. More precisely, Oi shifts towards Oj and Oj shifts towards Oi
by a (rounded) amount µ|Oj − Oi|, where the extreme case µ = 0 means
rigid unchanging opinions, while µ = 1/2 gives immediate agreement. For
example, for Q = 5 and µ = 0.3, for a confidence bound of three units,
the pair Oi = 2, Oj = 5 will become Oi = 3, Oj = 4. (If the opinion
difference is only one unit, one of the two partner takes the opinion of the
other. Thus a confidence bound of only one unit makes less sense since
then only this special case of one opinion jumping to the other remains, and
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Probability NOT to reach a consensus at Q = 3 (bottom) and 4 (top); 19^2, 7^3, 5^4, 5^5
Figure 4: Probability to find no consensus with three (lower data) and four
(upper data) possible missionary opinions, versus dimensionality. The tri-
angular lattices is put at dimensionality 5/2. Opinion 0 can only convince
opinions )± 1; all opinions are natural numbers. From [9].
no mutual compromise as in negotiations.) Already two centuries ago, the
mathematician Gauss (according to U. Krause) studied a similar problem:
How do two opinions evolve if one discussion partner takes the arithmetic
and the other takes the geometric average of the two opinions.
Particularly large populations can be simulated for the continuous ne-
gotiator model of infinite connection range, Fig.1. To plot the continuous
opinions we binned them into 20 intervals and show only the centrist inter-
vals 10 and 11 and the extremists in intervals 1 (+) and 2 (x). More plots
on the time dependence of negotiations are given in [6].
Basic programs for missionaries, opportunists and negotiators are pub-
lished in my earlier reviews [10].
5
0.1
1
0.01 0.1 1 10
S/
(Q
-1)
Q/N
Scaled number of surviving missionary opinions; from L.da F.Costa, N=100, Q=100 (+) and 1000 (x)
Figure 5: Scaling of the number S of surviving opinions as a function of
the number Q of possible discrete opinions and the number N of people, for
missionaries. From L. da Fontura Costa, priv, comm. PRELIMINARY
3 Consensus, Polarization or Fragmentation
All three standard models give after sufficiently long time one of three types of
results: We may find one, two or more than two different opinions surviving.
The case of one opinion or consensus can also be called dictatorship. The
case of two surviving opinions or polarization can also be called a balance
of power between opposition and government. The case with three or more
opinions or fragmentation can also be called anarchy, multi-party democracy,
multiculturality or diversity. Thus the models themselves do not tell us
whether the result is desirable or unwanted; this value judgement depends
on the application and interpretation.
(Similarly, once we physicists have mastered the multiplication 3 × 5 =
15 we can estimate that three bags, of five oranges each, contain in total
15 oranges, or that a room of 5 meter length and 3 meter width has an
6
0.001
0.01
0.1
1
0.0001 0.001 0.01 0.1 1 10 100 1000
S/
(Q
-1)
Q/N
N=10
N=100
N=1000
N=10000
Figure 6: As Fig.5 but for opportunists. From [16].
area of 15 square meters. Both results are usually regarded as correct even
though an orange does not have a surface of a square meter and a room
of 15 square meters may be regarded as too large for some and too small
for other purposes. Thus one model, here multiplication, may have different
interpretations which can be judged differently.)
Figs.2 and 3 show this similarity: Continuous opinions for opportunists
and for negotiators give three final main opinions in Fig.2, and discrete opin-
ions for missionaries do the same in Fig.3. The distribution of people among
the three opinions may be different, with very tiny groups having opinions
between the main ones, or fringe opinions near zero and one not dying out
for the continuous case.
For missionaries, not only square lattices have been simulated. The origi-
nal one-dimensional chains are less interesting (similar to Ising models) since
they do not have a phase transition (see next section). But for triangu-
lar, simple cubic, and hypercubic in four and five dimensions the results are
about the same, Fig.4: For Q ≤ 3 possible opinions, in most cases a consen-
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Figure 7: As Fig.5 but for negotiators, from [17].
sus is reached; for Q ≥ 4 possible opinions, such a consensus is rare. (The
confidence bound is unity for all cases.)
This threshold of 3.5 at unit confidence interval (or ǫ = 1/3.5) for mission-
aries corresponds to a threshold of ǫ = 1/2 for negotiators [11] and ǫ = 0.2 for
opportunists [12] with continuous opinions between zero and one: For larger
ǫ one has consensus, for decreasing epsilon one has first polarization into two
opinions, and then fragmentation into three or more opinions, ∝ 1/ǫ. The
negotiator threshold 1/2 is quite general [11] except if the model is made
very asymmetric [13]. In summary: Reaching a consensus requires a strong
willingness to listen to other opinions and to reach a compromise. For nego-
tiators the results are well described by a theory [14].
Missionaries with continuous opinions seem to reach always a consensus
[15], independent of the confidence bound ǫ.
Discrete instead of continuous opinions have the advantage that one can
find precisely whether or not two opinions agree, without a numerical cutoff
depending on the precision of the computer. Particularly opportunists could
8
now be simulated in much larger numbers [16]. Also, now a fixed point is
reached when all opinions agree or are out of reach from each other; real
numbers never fully agree and thus prevent a fixed point. Moreover, now
one has a maximum number Q of possible opinions, and the following scaling
law is valid: If the number N of people is much larger than the number Q of
possible opinions, then each opinion will find some followers, and the number
S of surviving opinions agrees with Q. In the opposite limit of N ≪ Q, each
person may keep its own opinion if separated by more then ǫ from the other
opinions: S = N . It is easiest to take a unit confidence interval, i.e. ǫ = 1/Q.
Then for missionaries (Fig.5), opportunists (Fig.6) and negotiators (Fig.7)
we get
S/Q = f(Q/N)
with a constant scaling function f for Q ≪ N , and f = N/Q for Q ≫ N ,
valid for large Q, S,N .
4 Networks
Most simulations of opportunists and negotiators had infinite connection
range, i.e. each person could get into contact with all other persons, with
the same probability. In contrast, the missionaries were usually simulated on
lattices. Reality is in between these two extremes of nearest lattice neigh-
bours and infinitely distant neighbours. Small world networks [18] and in
particular scale-free networks of Baraba´si-Albert type [19] have been used
as the topological basis of opinion dynamics. The name scale-free means
that there is no characteristic number k of neighbours for each site; instead
the number of sites having k neighbours decays with a power-law in k like
1/k3. These networks are supposed to describe the empirical fact than with
a rather small number of steps one can connect most people in the USA with
most other people there via personal acquaintances.
Their history, often misrepresented, started in 1941 with Flory’s percola-
tion theory on a Bethe lattice where each site has exactly k neighbours, with
the same k for all sites; if the probability for two neighbours to be connected
is larger than the percolation threshold pc = 1/(k− 1), one infinite cluster of
connected sites appears, coexisting with many small clusters including iso-
lated sites. 15 years later Erdo¨s and Re´nyi modified it such that each site is
connected with a small probability with other sites, arbitrarily far away; this
9
random graph belongs to the same “universality class” of mean-field perco-
lation as Flory’s solution but now the number k of neighbours for each site
fluctuates according to a Poisson distribution. We get the desired 1/k3 law
only by a very different construction (the rich get richer; or powerful people
attract even more supporters). We start with m sites all connected with
each other. This network is then enlarged, adding one site per step. Each
new site selects, among the already existing sites, exactly m neighbours, ran-
domly with a probability proportional to the number of neighbours that site
had already before. Once a new site has selected an old site as a neighbour,
also the new site is neighbour to the old site: this neighbourhood relation is
symmetric. A computer program published in [17] at the beginning contains
this construction of the network. As a result, the probability that a site has
k neighbours decays as 1/k3 for k ≥ m.
If one now wants to put opinion dynamics onto this network, one may
waste much memory. With a million sites it is possible that one of them
(typically one of the starting sites) has a large number of neighbours, of the
order thousands. Then a neighbourhood table of size 106 × 104 is needed.
Aleksiejuk [20] programmed a one-dimensional neighbourhood table to save
memory, but this is difficult to understand. It is much more practical, and
does not change the results much, to switch from the above undirected net-
works to directed networks: The new site still selects m neighbours from the
old sites, but these m old sites do not have the new site as a neighbour: The
neighbourhood relation has become asymmetric or directed. Similarly, a new
member of a political party knows the heads of that party, but these heads
don’t know the new member. Thus a hierarchy of directed relations is built
up, which starts with the latest members of the network at the bottom and
ends with the initial core members at the top.
Actually, Figs.6,7 are for a directed scale-free network, but the undirected
case with infinite-range connectivity looks very similar [16] for opportunists.
The simplicity of the scaling law makes it invariant against details of the
network.
Also for other questions [21], negotiators with continuous opinions be-
tween zero and one on a Baraba´si-Albert network showed little difference
between directed and undirected neighbourhoods. Fig.8 shows the resulting
size distribution of opinion clusters. Such an opinion cluster is the set of
people, not necessarily connected, having the same (within 10−6) opinion.
Consensus means everybody is in one opinion cluster; thus the opposite frag-
mentation limit ǫ = 0.1 is more interesting. If we increase systematically
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the network size, we see in Fig.8 a peak moving to the right with increasing
network size. This peak comes from large clusters, of the order of one per
simulated network, which contain a positive fraction of the whole network.
To the left of this peak, separated by a valley only for large networks, is
the statistics for lots of small clusters, down to isolated people sharing their
opinion with nobody else. The size distribution of these many small clusters
is not much affected by the network size except that their statistics is better
for larger networks. This cluster statistics is similar to percolation theory
slightly above the threshold: One “infinite” cluster coexists with many finite
clusters. But our clusters are sets of agreeing people, not sets of neighbouring
sites as in percolation theory.
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Figure 8: Size distribution of opinion clusters for negotiators on directed
Baraba´si-Albert networks, with continuous opinions between zero and one
and ǫ = 0.1. All network sizes, from 100 to 50,000, were simulated 100 times.
From [17].
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Figure 9: Transition width for missionaries with mixed global and local in-
teraction, from [23]. This width is defined as the interval in the initial con-
centration of up opinions (Q = 2 square lattice) within which the fraction of
samples finishing all up increases from 50 to 70 percent.
5 Phase Transition
The simplest version of missionaries [4] has only Q = 2 possible opinions
up and down, in which case bounded confidence makes no sense and can
be omitted. We always reach a consensus on the square lattice: Either
everybody is up or everybody is down. If initially half of the opinions are up
and the others are down, then after the simulation of many samples one finds
[22] that half of the samples are all up and half are all down. (For negotiators,
the limit Q = 2 destroys the compromise part of shifting opinions somewhat
and thus does not make sense. For opportunists we expect in this limit the
same behaviour as for missionaries except that the dynamics is much faster:
Each person takes the initial majority opinion.)
When we vary the initial up concentration away from 50 percent, then
12
for the small and intermediate sizes for which the standard missionary model
reaches its final fixed point within reasonable time, the fraction of all-up sam-
ples also moves away from 50 percent. Increasing the initial up concentration
from 40 to 60 percent, we see [22] for small square lattices a slow increase of
the fraction of up-samples, and for larger lattices this increase is somewhat
steeper. Thus one might extrapolate that for infinite lattices one has a sharp
phase transition: For initial up concentrations below 50 percent all sam-
ples finish down, and for concentrations above 50 percent all samples finish
up. For the standard model the numerical evidence is meager due to small
system sizes, but Schulze [23] combined the traditional nearest-neighbour in-
teractions with global interactions similar to the nice mean-field theory of
of Slanina and Lavic¸ka [24]: two people of arbitrary distance who agree in
their opinions convince their nearest neighbours of this opinion. Then, as
predicted [24], the times to reach the final fixed point are much shorter and
their distribution decays exponentially. Thus larger lattices can be simulated
and give in Fig.8 a width of the transition varying as 1/L in L× L squares,
10 < L < 10, 000. This is clear evidence for a simple phase transition.
In the simplification [25] suggested by a third-year student, to allow al-
ready one single missionary to convince the four square-lattice neighbours,
one still has a complete consensus but no more a phase transition: The frac-
tion of final up samples agrees with the initial concentration of up opinions,
as found independently in simulation [26] and approximate theory [24]; see
Slanina lecture in this Seminar. Easier to understand is that in one dimen-
sion, also this phase transition does not exist [4]; this absence corresponds
to the lack of phase transition in the one-dimensional Ising model of 1925
which is so often mispronounced as Eyesing-Model by unhistorical speakers,
instead of Eesing.
6 Variants
Numerous variants of the above standard models were published, and can be
summarized here only shortly.
Negotiators: The inventors of negotiators [6] published several alterna-
tive, for example with unsymmetric opinion shifts as a result of compromise,
with negotiators on a square lattice etc [27]. For negotiators on scale-free
networks, the network was made more realistic by increasing triangular re-
lations (the friend of my neighbours is also my own friend); the qualitative
13
results remained unchanged [17]. Opinions which differ in their convincing
power were simulated by Assmann [13], and the interactions of opinions on
several different aspects of life by Jacobmeier [28].
Missionaries: If you dislike the complete consensus enforced by mission-
aries, just let their neighbours follow the convincing rule only with a high
probability, or let a small minority of dissidents always be against the ma-
jority. Then the full consensus is replaced by the more realistic widespread
consensus [4, 29]. The role of neutrality in a three-opinion model, of opin-
ion leaders, and of social temperature was studied by He et al [30]. Sousa
[31] showed that the network results are robust against the inclusion of more
triangular relations (preceding paragraph) and that complete consensus can
be avoided with Q > 2. If the opinion dynamics starts already while the
network is still growing not much is changed[32].
According to [33], the missionaries are part of a wider group of cellular
automata giving about the same results; see also [7]. Long-range interactions,
decaying with a power law of the distance on a square lattice, still need
to be explained [34]. Frustration occurs if we switch from sequential to
simultaneous updating and one person gets different opinions simultaneously
from different pairs of missionaries [35]. The time-dependent decay of the
number of people who never changed their opinion is Ising-like only in one
dimension [36]. Other (dis-)similarities with Ising models are discussed in
[37, 38].
Opportunists: Fortunato [12] compared the threshold for ǫ when the
number of neighbour varies proportional to the total population to the case-
where it is independent of the population size. Hegselmann and Krause [39]
compared various alternative averages to the standard arithmetic average.
7 Applications
The most successful application of the missionary model were political elec-
tions. This does not mean that we can predict which candidate will win the
next elections. Neither can statistical physics predict which air molecules
will hit my nose one minute from now; the laws of Boyle-Mariott and Gay-
Lussac predict the pressure, i.e. the average number of molecules hitting my
nose per picosecond. Similarly, many elections have shown a rather similar
picture for the number of votes which one candidate gets (in case voters can
select among numerous candidates, not among a few parties). The larger the
14
number v of votes is, the smaller is the number n(v) of candidates getting
v votes. For intermediate v one has n(v) ∝ 1/v while for large and small v,
downward deviations are seen: Nobody gets more than 100 percent of the
votes, and nobody gets half a vote. Missionaries on their way to the con-
sensus fixed point on a Baraba´si-Albert network agreed well with Brazilian
votes [40], and similar agreement was also found in modified networks [41, 31]
and Indian elections. However, exceptions exist (S. Fortunato, priv. comm.).
It would be interesting to check whether opportunists and negotiators also
agree with Brazilian election results.
If one person changes opinion, does this influence the whole community ?
This question, known as damage spreading in physics but invented in 1969 for
genetics by Stuart Kauffman, was recently simulated in detail by Fortunato
and the review [9] is still up-to-date.
Readers may try to become rich by going into advertising: How can mass
media influence opinion dynamics? For missionaries [26] the answer is clear:
The larger the population is the less effort is needed to convince everybody
to drink Coke instead of Pepsi; but the advertizing has to come early in the
opinion formation process, not when most people have already made their
choice. Again, analogous studies for opportunists and negotiators would be
nice. Or perhaps you get rich with [42].
8 Summary
Humans may dislike to be simulated like Ising spins, and clearly the brain is
more complicated than one binary variable. But humans have been treated
in this way since a long time: The astronomer Halley, known for his comet,
tried to estimate human mortality already three centuries ago. Life insurance,
health insurance, car insurance are present widespread examples of treating
humans like inanimate particles with probabilistic behaviour, relying on the
laws of large numbers. Whoever dislikes this treatment, should not blame
todays sociophysicists for having started it. Already more than two millenia
ago, Empedocles compared humans with fluids: Some are like wine and
water, mixing well; others dislike each other, like oil and water (J. Mimkes,
priv. comm.).
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9 Summary
I thank my collaborators working on these models since the beginning of
this millenium: S. Moss de Oliveira, A.O. Sousa, J.S. Andrade, A.A. Mor-
eira, A.T. Bernardes, U.M.S. Costa, A. Araujo, R. Ochrombel, C. Schulze,
J. Bonnekoh, P.M.C de Oliveira, H. Meyer-Ortmanns, S. Fortunato, P. Ass-
mann, and N. Klietsch.
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